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To clarify the relationshipbetween the assets anti liabilitiesof
financial intermediaries, on the onehand, and of national wealth
or national aggregates ocertain assets and liabilities, on theother,
it is necessary to look at thebalance sheets of economic units,in-
dividually and in groups, and attheir combination or consolida-
tion into a national balance sheet.This rather technical and drab
task will be undertaken in theAppendix, which may he omitted
by readers not interestedin the social accounting methodsunder-
lying the estimates or inthe technical problems theyraise. How-
ever, theyshould read the followingbrief summary, which
indicates why the characteristicsof combination and consolidation
of balance sheets ofindividual economic units on a groupor
national basis are relevant forevaluating the share ofFinancial
intermediaries in national wealth.
Summary of socialaccounting aspects
1. Total assets offinancial intermediaries cannotbe meaning-
fully compared withnational wealth.Intermediaries' assets is a
gross,unconsolidated conceptinfluenced by the extent oflayering
in the economy;national wealth, a net,consolidated notion that
eliminatesallcreditor-debtor andholder-issuer relationships
among domesticunits.49 In order to Find ameaningful magnitude
"The net worth of financialintermediarieS can, of course, bevalidly compared
with national wealth, butthis is seldom a significantcomparison, as it is an essential
feature of financialintermediarieS that their total assets aremuch in excess of their
net worth.
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Iwith which to compare total assets of financial intermediariesit is
necessary to have comparable aggregative figures for totalassets
of nonlinancial business enterprises and of Ultiniates, Iiiother
words, the comparison presupposes a national balance sheion
esseiltia II y an ilnconsoli(lated hasis.e0
To what extent the results of comparisons oii aConsolidated
and unconsolidated basis arc likely to differ may he illustratedby
a simplified example. Assume donIeSti(; tangible assets of 1,000;
a
net foreign balance in the form of claims of 100;aggregate do-
mestic claims of 600; equity securities of 300; and totalassets of
financial intermediaries of 500, consisting of 400claims, 70
equities, and 30 tangible assets. Then national wealthamoLmito
1,100, while the unconsolidated total of either assetsor of liabili-
ties plus net worth (Items 84 or 94 of Appendix TableA-I) isas
high as 2,000. Hence the share of financial intermediariesin na-
tional wealth, if such a relation were calculated, would be
1100 45 per cent, while their share in unconsolidatednationalassets
500 would amount to only-25 per cent. Differencesof this 2000
order are typical of those actually found in the UnitedStates.
Comparisons can validly be made betweenthe amount of
specific assets or liabilities held by financialintermediaries with
the national total of the sameassets or liabilities. Again using the
example in the preceding paragraph, the shareof financial inter-
400 mediai-ies in claims would be 57 per cent; that inequities
23 per cent; and that in tangibleassets 3 per cent,
A consistent valuation basis forall balance sheet items is
necessary, particularly for valuing thesame types of assets in the
balance sheets of the differentunits and groups. The problems
arising here will be discussedbriefly in the Appendix.















In or(ler to clarify the basic accountingand statistical relations
involved, it will suffice to (listinguish four groupsof economic
units: financial intermediaries, nonfinancialbusiness eutcrpTiSeS
househokls, and governments which vill beidentified by the sub-
sCuil)ISf,b, 1,, and g, while their total is indcated by n; to segregate
six balance sheet items, total assets (A) ,tangtble(real)assets
(T) , intangible (financial) assets(1) which include claims (C)
and equities (L) -- the latter termequal to net worth (14') -
and net foreign assets (F) which mayl)e positive or negative; and
to designate thecreditor or owner group by a right, and thedebtor
or issuer group by aleft, subscript.51 We then have thefollowing
basic equations and relationships:52
T + F -- 7 + T + Th + T0 + F1+ F + F,, +F0
(national wealth) (1)
=H' + b'1 + 5W + JJT
A,= Af+Ab+/lh+Ao
= T + I+F
= (Tf+lf+F,)+(Tb+h+Fb)+
(T5 + Jh±F) + (T0 + I + F)
= (,I + ,W) + (I +H') + (,I + H') + (J ± 01'V)
I,Ij + lb + 11 + J (national intangible assets)
A,= T1+ fIf+bIf+hI1+UIf'1
(assets of financial intermediaries)
(tangible asset share of
financial intermediaries)
(national asset share of
financial intermediaries)
(intangible asset share of
financial intermediaries)




\Thcre no sul)script is indicated, napplies thus
if = Jf = /11 + btf + hif011.
These equations assume that the sameitem is carried at the same amount,ie. the
market value or an approximation toit, in the balance sheets of thecreditor or
debtor, or the holder and issuerIii that case no allowance is necessaryfor the
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The usual ratio of the assets of Ilnancialinterrne(liarjes tona
tional wealth is omitted from the list since itis of a hybrid
nature, the numerator being notcommensurableconceptually with the denominator. The equationsand ratios can alsohe set
Lip for subgroups within the four majorgroups of economic units
and for individual assets and liabilities.As a matter of fact,the
national asset share (Ratio R2) hasbeen used in thepreceding
section in the calculation of financialintermediaries share in
individual forms of assets andliabilities.
The national asset share (R2)is the broadestmeasure of the
relative importance of financialintermediaries in theeconomy.
Its usability, however, islimited for somepurposes by the fact that it dependson the ratio of intangible to tangibleassets in the
economy and thus does not providea specific measure of the im-
portance of financial intermediariesas owners or issuers of in-
tangible assets. Theintangible asset share (R3)is not subject
to this drawback, but isinfluenced by the size ofclaims, liabilities. and holdingsamong financial intermediarjes.3If it is wanted to
eliminate these,recourse must be had to ratioslike R4 or Rd and R7. The tangibleasset share(R1)is of little practical signill-
12The larger theseinterfina,icjal assets andliabilities (e.g. interbank deposits; hold- ings of bank stock byinvestment coInpanp),the higher .R, other things being equal.)
cance since only a minor part of the total assets of financial inter-
mediaries consists of taiigibles.
Ratio R embodies the assumption that financial iI1trl1l(liarics
can be regarded as associations of individuals. It therefore treats
the ratio between their holdings of tangible assets plus their net
claims against, afl(l equities in, other economic groups (i.e. busi-
ness, government, and foreigners)and national wcalth as an
indicator of the share of financial intermediaries in national
wealth. Such a ratio is a complement to similarly calculated ratios
foz- the other economic groups - in each case including in the
numerator tangible assets held by the group and the net claim or
liability (including equities held and issued) of the group against
or to all other groups - ratios which together add to 100 per cent
since the net claims of some groups are offset by the net liabilities
of others.
Ratios R and R7 are intended to show the importance of finan-
cial intermediaries as outlets for funds of the other groups, a sub-
ject which will be briefly explored in tile full study. They differ
in that R is limited to claims, while R6 is more comprehensive.
including both claims against financial intermediaries and shares
of (and other equity participations in)financial intermediaries
in the numerator of the ratio and using total assets of the creditor
groups as the denominator.
The actual calculation of the various ratios, while in no case
simple and always subject to a substantial margin of error because
of the nature of the magnitudes involved, differs considerably in
difficulty and reliability. Of the figures needed, total assets of
financial intermediaries, and their subdivisions such as tangibles,
claims and equities - i.e. the numerator of R1 to R3 -- is generally
the one easiest to obtain with a reasonable degree of accuracy.
Difficulties and margins of error increase when it becomes neces-
sary to split the claims andliabilities of financial intermediaries
by debtor and creditor groups as is required in the numeratorof
ratios R4, RG and R1. Difficulties grow further when estimates have
to be made of total assets and theirsubdivisions for other groups
of economic units - needed as numerator in ratio R and as de-
nominators in all ratios except R1 - because balance sheet data
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for them are, asa rule, much less plentiful and lessreliable thai1 for most types of financialintermediaries, Itis,tlie1-doic1101 astonisltit,o that virtually the onlyratio that has hithertobeefl caictilatcil is the 11)1)1-idratio of financial interjnediai.ies'
assets to national wealth, sinceit requires estimates only foragglegatc
assets of financial intermediaries andfor aggregatetangible and net lorcigit assets. These difficultiesvill also explainwIt)- Oflly three ratios- the iiatioiial wealth share, the nationalasset share and tileliabilities' share of financialintermediaries- are pre- sentecj hiere.5
Share in national wealth
In measuring theover-all significance ofdevelopments likethe growth of financial intermediariesor of liquidassets, it is Usual to compare theni withnational wealth.5It has alreadybeen argued earlier in this sectionthat thiscomparison is not apIM-opri.
ate because national wealthemerges from theConSohidale(1 bal- ance Sheet of all economicunits as the value oftangible assets (and net foreignbalance) only, whileConcepts like theassets of financial intermediariesor liquid assets are takenfrom combined balance sheets and, hence,arc on a gross basis ratherthan, as national wealth,on a net basis.56 Comparisonbetween the total assets of financial intermediariesand national wealth,even though inappropriate for determining thelevel of the ratio,may never- theless providean indication of trends inthe ratio to theextent that it can beassumed that the nationalfinancial interrelations ratio (R5), i.e. theratio betweennational assets (tuefootings in
In the full study,estimates will also be shown forR1. That volume togetherwith the nm,itcrjals in \'olunleIll, Part I, of R. W.Coldsrniih, A Study ol Savingin time United State5(Princeton University Press,1951) will also niake itpossible to calculate R,, R5, and R6.
An example is providedby A. A. Eerie andV. J. Peclerson, LiquidAssets and Na- tional JVealtJt (Macmillan,1934) Chap. V,e.g. p. 73.
In the cowbinatiomof balance sheetsan exception ic usuallymade to the extent that the statenenof affiliatedeconomic units, primarilyparent and subsidiary cor- polations are on acommsoijilatect basis. This doesnot affect the basic priutipicthat no item in the balance sheetof independenteconomic unijs eliminated in the combined national balancesheet.
96the combined balance sheet. of all economic units) and national
wealth (the footings in the consolidated balance sheet ) remains
unchanged.
The ratio of the assets of financial intermediaries to national
wealth has increased steadily from 1900 to 1945 (see Table 22).
The increase was slow up to the early twenties, the ratio having risen
only from 21 per cent in 1900 to 28 per cent in 1922. From then
on the rise has been very sharp for a quarterof a century. In the
TABLE22
Share of Financial Intermediaries in National Wealth and Assets
NATIONAL SHARE OF FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARIES'
WEALTH NATIONAL jYatioiial Xational .P%iidional intangible
(or equity) ASSETS WealthEquityAssetsAssets
(billions of dollars) (per ceizi)
Covers financial intermediaries included in Table 1.The inclusion of the addi-
tional two groups shown in Table 2 would raise thefigures only slightly - generally
by one percentage point for all benchmark dates except1929 wlie,i the percentage
shares would go up 2 to 3 points under thebroader definition.
Column
1R. W. Goldsmith, .4 Study of Sauing in theUnited States (Princeton Univer-
sity Press), Vol. III. (For an earlier slightly differentversion of (lie estimates,
see Conference of Research in IncomeantI Wealth, Studies in income and
Wealth, Volume Fourteen [National Bureauof Economic Research,1951J,
p. 18.) Figures exclude militarydurables.
2Preliminary estimates; figures and rlerivahion will be shownin R. W. Goldsmith,
op. cit., Vol. III, Part I.
5,5Total assets of financial intermediaries (Fable 1)divided by columns 1 and 2,
respectively.
4Tangible assets of financial intermediaries and netclaims against business and
government (approximated from Table 7,liabilities--sum of lines 1, 2, 5, 7.
and 8minus assetslines 6, 7, 10, and partof 5) divided by column I.
above.
6Intangible assets of financial intermediaries (Table7, line 12 minus line 9)
divided by difference between columns 2 and I.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1900 $88 $160 21 10 11 24
1912 165 310 24 12 13 26
1922 334 650 28 14 15 29
1929 439 980 35 17 16 28
1933 330 730 40 21 18 32
1939 396 881' 49 24 22 39
1945 571 1,560 66 37 24 38































seven years between 1922 and 1929 the ratio ci financialin[cr
titediat ks assets to national wealth itictcase(1 from 28to pet
cent. it coiitiniicd to rise at ahou t the same speed (luring the
decade, reaching 49 per cent in1939.The sharp further
increase
(luring World War 11 up to a peak of fiG per cent in1945PrOved
to l)c temporary. By 1949 the ratio has reverted tO 18)Ct cent,
virtually the same as ten years earlier.7 Theincrease in theratio
tip to 1915 reflects a higher rate of growth of thcassets of fiIallcjal
intermediaries than of national wealth,or as during tileGreat
f)cpression, a snmller decrease. Between 1900 and1949 national
wealth oniy increased a little more than tenfold,while tileasscs of financial intermediariesgrew more than twenty-threetimes,
These figures obviously do not mean thatfinancialiilter,nedj.
aries ownea nearly one-fourth of the national wealthin 1900
and one-half now' if national wealth istlIl(ICI-Stoo(I in theSenSe of
tangible assets. It has already been shown inSection 3 thatonly
a few per cent of all tangible assets were directlyowned by finan-
cial intermediaries, Nor do tileratios mean that financialinter-
mediaries in 1949 had claim toor control of one-half of allassets iii tile country. That proportion,as will be seen in thenext Sec.
tion, was considerably lower. Nordo the figuresmeasure other
economically significant relations betweentile assets of financial
itilerinediaries, on one hand, anda comparable national total,on the other. These ratiosare nothing but an arithmeticrelation be- tween a numerator anda denominator which arenot comrnei.
suraljie. While theyare easier to calculate thanmore appropriate
ratios, and probablyare more familiar, theiruse should be avoided if the other ratiosare available.
The ratio of financialintermediaries' net claimsagainst business
' These ratios disregard the fact thatthe assets of linanclidintermediaries are based on book values for all fixed interest-l)earing





































(including agriculture and unincorporated businessenterprises)
and government to national equity (I?4)has moved parallel to
the national wealth ratio, though on aconsiderahly lower lcvcl.
It rose continuously between 1900 and I°41mm one-tenth to
almost two-fifths afl(l fell back sharply to one-fourthin 1949. To
evaluate level and movements of this ratio, onewould need par-
allel ratios for individuals, business, and governmentwhich are
not yet available. Because of the natureof the ratio, the pro-
CHART7
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Ratio scalenounced increase in the ratiofor financial intermediaries
have been offset by decreasesin the ratio of some or all of the
other groups. There is littledoubt that this offset has been pro-
vided primarily by the government(particularly between 1912
and 1922 and between 1939and 1945) and secondarily by business
(particularly between 1922 and 1929).(See Chart 7.)
Share in national assets
The comparison between thetotal assets of financial intermediaries
and total national assets, i.e.the footings in the combined bal-
ance sheet of all independenteconomic units (affiliated corpora-
tions being treated on aconsolidated basis if whoily or almost
wholly owned) , is the parallel to thecomparisons of holdings of a
given asset by financial intermediariesand total outstanding of
the asset, which have been presentedin Section 3. The ratio of the
assets of financial intermediaries tototal national assets, there-
fore, is the most comprehensive measureof the position of financial
intermediaries in the national economy and in a sense summarizes
the main results of this report.
It is well to recall that both totalnational assets and the assets
of financial intermediaries are gross concepts,i.e. the two meas-
ures do not eliminatecreditor-debtor or owner-issuer relation.
ships between independent economic units, although they do
eliminate such relationships between corporate affiliates. Hence
the insertion of additional institutions in the chain leading from
tangible assets to their ultimate owners (either individuals or
government and private collectives) results in an increase in na-
tional assets, even though the real value of national wealth remains
unchanged. Total national assets also increase without any rise
in current or real national wealth if one group of units borrows
fromanother group for consumptive purposes(i.e. without a
counterpart to the debt appearing on the asset side of the bor-
rower's balance sheet) , particularly if the government borrows to
finance military expenditures.
These two factors have over the last fifty years led to a inure
rapid increase in national assets than in national wealth, irre-
spective of whether both measures are expressed in current or
100deflated prices. As a result the ratio of national assets tonational
wealth has increased as comparison of columns I and 2 ofTable 22
shows. At the turn of the century, total national assetsexceeded
national wealth by about four-fIfths. The ratio increasedfairly
continuously during the next three decades with the resultthat
in 1929 national assets were somewhat more thantwice as large
as national wealth. 'T'he ratiocontinued at that level until the late
thirties. It shot up to 2% at the end of World War H butl)y 1949
had fallen back to about 2¼. The lack of net changein this ratio
over a decade which witnessedfar-reaching changes in financial
structure was the result of two offsettingtendencies. One of these,
increasing the ratio, was the large-scaleborrowing by the federal
government to finance World WarII. The other, decreasing the
ratio, was the repayment of private debtduring the war and the
sharp increase in the prices oftaflgil)]e assets after the war which
reduced the ratio of prewar debt to assets.
Since the ratio of national assets tonational wealth has been
coflSi(lerably above unity throughout the lastfifty years and has
shown an increasing trend, one would expectthe ratio of financial
intermediaries' assets to national assets to beconsiderably lower
than their share in national wealth,discussed in the last section,
and to increase less rapidly. Bothdeductions are borne out by the
actual ratios shown in Table 22.
In 1900 financial intermediariesaccounted for approximately
11 per cent of total national assets.The ratio increased slowly to
15 per cent in the early twenties.By 1929 it had risen toapproxi-
mately 16 per cent and by 1933 toIS per cent. The increase ac-
celerated during the thirties andcontinued, though at a slower
pace, during WorldWar II. As a result the assetsof financial
intermediaries in 1945 were equal toalmost 25 per cent of total
national assets. In the four yearsfollowing, the ratio fell back
rather sharply to 21 per cent. Inother words, at the presenttime
the combined assets of allfinancial intermediaries are equal to
about one-fifth of the combined assetsof all independent economic
units within the country and toabout one-fourth of all unitsother
than financial intermediaries.These ratios are much more ap-
propriate for use in characterizingthe relative importanceof
101Financial intermediaries in the economic structure of thecountly
than the ninch higher ratios of financial intermediaries'assets to
national wealth.
All three main groups of tmancial intermediaries havepartici.
pated in the increase of the share of financial intermediariesin
total national assets, though to a different degree and atdifferent
times. The assets of the banking system accounted forapproxi.
mately 8 per cent of total national assets at all benchmark(lates
between 1900 and 1929 but increased to approximately iiper
cent in 1949, most of the increase taking place during the thirties
and World War II. Indeed, the ratio declined notinconsiderably
after 1945, when it reached a peak of 14 per cent. Theshare of
insurance organizations in total national assets,on the other
hand, increased almost continuously over the last fiftyyears. It
started with only I per cent in 1900; rose rather slowly to 3per
cent in1 929; but then accelerated its relative growthuntil it
reached a share of 6 per cent in 1949. The 5 pointincrease over
the last fifty years was about equally divided betweenprivate and
government insurance organizations. Since government insur-
ance started its rapid growth only in the thirties it accoupted,how-
ever, for most of the increase in the share of all insuranceorgan-
izations in total national assets between 1933and 1949. The share
of other financial intermediaries in total nationalassets rose
from 2 per cent in 1900 to 5per cent in 1929, reflecting rapid
gTowth in the assets administered by personaltrust departments
and assets of savings and loan associationsand the advent of in-
vestment companies and land banks. Theywere, however, unable
to increase their share further during the lasttwenty years or even
to maintain it, the result primarily ofa relatively slow growth of
the assets of personaltrust funds.
Grouping financial intermediariesdifferently, we find that the
share of private intermediariesrose from 11 per cent of totalna-
tional assets in 1900 and 15per cent in 1929 to about 16 per cent
in 1949. Public intermediaries,on the other hand, had been of
negligible importance in 1900and even in 1929 accounted for
only about 1 percent of total national assets- represented pri-
marily by the assets of theFederal Reserve System- but their
102ry share increased to 5 per cent in 1949, mostof the rise accounted
tO for by the Federal Reserve System and byfederal, state, and local
insurance funds.
ci- A second proportion is also of considerableinterest: the ratio of
the total assets of financialintermediaries, practically all of which
flt consist of intangibles, to all intangible assetswithin the nation.
Xi- The ratio remained at around 30 per centuntil 1929 but increased
tes fairly sharply during the last twenty years,notwithstanding a
er slight relapse during World War II,reaching approximately 38
tes per cent in 1949. Therise in the share of financial intermediaries
ly between 1900 and 1930 in totalnational assets, and also in na-
of tioflal wealth, is thus due mainly to anincrease in the ratio of
er intangibles to tangibles in the American economy.This move-
It ment in turn reflects (I) theincreasing complexity of financial
Cr interrelations evidenced in a lengthening at manypoints of the
It chain between ultimate savers andultimate investors and (2) the
er sharp increase in the volume of governmentdebt incurred during
nd World War I and not matched by anincrease in assets. During
r- these thirty years the growth offinancial intermediaries only kept
pace with, and of course waspartly responsible for, the expansion
fl. in the country's intangible assetoverlay. In the last two decades,
re on the other hand,the intangible assets of financialintermediaries
have grown much faster - exceptduring World War II - than
those held by other sectorsof the economy. This is primarilydue
to the very slowincrease of those assets heldby other sectors
'which do not represent claimsagainst financial intermediaries.
en
The small increase in these typesof assets, in turn, reflects pri-
of
manly the absence of anysubstantial increase between 1929and
1949 in the value of theholdings of corporate stocks andbonds by
he
households and the relativelyslow growth of receivablesand pay-
ables among nonfinancialbusiness enterprises and of mortgages
held by households. Thecontinued and even acceleratedincrease
of in the share of financialintermediaries in national assets overthe
or last two decades is thus due not, asit was from 1900 to 1930, to a
ri- rise in the ratio ofintangibles to tangibles for the economy as a
eir whole, but to a shift inthe distribution of theholdings of in-
103tangible assets between financialintermediaries, oil theone hand and all othersectors of the economy, on the other.
Bearing upon financingcapita! formation
Can anyofusions be drawn from the levelor the trend ju share ol financialiliterniediaries in total nationalassets or wealth
or ill any Specific tYpe ofassets and liabilities, as to theirshare in financing capital formation,i.e. cxpcnditurcson new reI)ruchIlcjbl
durable assets? Theanswer to this seemingly obviousand Simple question tlltflsout to bC negative and ratherCOmplicated 1)0thfor conceptual and statisticalreasons, though the discussionis niUchi sinipi 'fled here.
The mainreason for this is theimpossibility ofestablis1j11ga COrresl)ondelwe betweena change in assets of financialintermecli aries and the acquisitionof specific newdurables. Evemiwhen funds flow directlyfrom financialintermediaries to uItimaiii. Vestors, it is asa rule impossible to identifythe specifIcuse to which such fundshave beenput because theyare necessarily mingled with otherfunds availableto the investor frominternal souices (such asretamed earnings andearned capitalconsumption allowances) or fromexternal SourCes (suchas borrowingsor sales of own e(Juitysecurities). \Vhen the flow is indirectas for in- stance when financialintermediaries buyoutstandi!lg Securities and tile selleruses the procceds to supplyfunds to investors_it is still less feasibleto identify changes inassets of financialinter. mediaries with theacquisition of specificnew durable assets. Itis thus impossibleto say whatpart of the fundsmade available by financial intermediariesduring allyone year in tile formof an increase in loansor security holdingswas used to enableinvestors to acquirenew durableassets, i.e. whatpart financed capital for- matioii and whatpart was used forotherpurposes, particularly tile financingof intangibleasset acquisitionsor of an excess of current expendituresover current income(e.g. if Treasuryse- curities issuedto finance a deficitare purchased)Still less is it possible to deducefrom astatement of theassets held by financial intermediaries at anyone moment thecumuilati'c netamounts made available bythem up to thatmoment for tile acquisitionof specific types ofdurable assets.
104tid, The second, though much less important, reasonwhy it is im-
possible to use the available data on the assetsof financial inter-
mediaries to measure their contribution tocapital formation is
tii that we (10 not even kiov the actual amountof funds macic avail-
Ith, able by financial intermediaries toeach of the other sectors of the
in economy. All that weusually have are changes in the balance sheet
hic value of holdings between two dates.These changes are not
Pie identical with the net flow of funds betweenfinancial interrnedi-
for aries and other sectors because of theexistence of realized gains
ich and losses and revaluations of assets,although the differences
usually are not substantial.
a There is, however, one sense inwhich a relationship can he
di- established between funds suppliedby financial intermediaries
and financing of the other sectorsof the economy. That isthe
in- determination of the share offinancial intermediaries in thetotal
to supply of funds to individualeconomic units or groups of them.
ily Calculation of this share requires afull sourcesand-usesoffun
nat statement for these units or groups.The ratio between funds sup-
ion plied by financialintermediaries and all sources offunds which
les can be calculatedfrom such a statement is ofconsiderable help in
in- studying the importance offinancial intermediaries infinancing
ies the different types ofeconomic units that makecapital expendi-
- it tures. It indicateswhat proportion of thetotal funds used by
Cr- different groups ofeconomic units during agiven period came
t is from financial intermediaries,either on a gross or netbasis; and
by it also shows whethersignificant changes overtime have occurred
an in the sources of fundsof the various sectors ofthe economy. The
ors calculation of these figurescalls primarily forbalance sheets, in-
or- come accounts,and supplementary datafor the differenteconomic
rt groups and cannotbe based on statisticsof financial intermedi-
of aries. Their presentationand discussion is thereforeregarded as
SC- falling beyond the scopeof this report. Suchfigures, however, are
it relevant for anevaluation of the role offinancial intermediariesin
ial the economy and willconsequently be investigatedin the full
its study.
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